Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism by Puljek-Shank, R.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/176250
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fdem20
Download by: [46.36.189.76] Date: 14 March 2017, At: 02:27
Democratization
ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20
Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive
governance in neopatrimonialism
Randall Puljek-Shank
To cite this article: Randall Puljek-Shank (2016): Dead letters on a page? Civic
agency and inclusive governance in neopatrimonialism, Democratization, DOI:
10.1080/13510347.2016.1206081
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1206081
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
View supplementary material 
Published online: 25 Jul 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 88
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Dead letters on a page? Civic agency and inclusive
governance in neopatrimonialism
Randall Puljek-Shank
Centre for International Conﬂict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Institute of Management
Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Neopatrimonialism has explanatory power regarding the limitations of post-war
democratization because it considers the combination of formally-democratic
institutions together with power relations based on patronage. Neopatrimonialism
does not however explain why marginalized groups make political claims in such
inhospitable climates, nor have their experiences of governance processes been
adequately explored. This paper addresses this gap based on empirical research in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, applying a framework of civic agency to elaborate the goals
and capacities of civil society actors. Under what conditions can civic agency foster
inclusive governance outcomes? The research found that perceptions of limited and
ambiguous outcomes from engagement in governance processes encourage civil
society organizations to have incrementalist goals and limit self-perceptions of
capacity. Inclusive outcomes were nonetheless more likely with persistent intentions
and actions. Transactional capacities based on ties to political actors rather than
participatory capacities based on political mobilization were more likely to lead to
inclusive governance outcomes.
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Introduction
Scholarship of democratization within “liberal peace” intervention after war has fre-
quently characterized the resulting governance as “(mere) electoral democracy”.1 The
(lack of) political and civil rights however does not completely describe the ways that
formally democratic governance can be devoid of a democratic essence that includes
all citizens. Elections are not a guarantee of accountability to citizens or the public
good as implied in Tilly’s deﬁnition of democratic governance as one in which “political
relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually
binding consultation”.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina is chronologically the second oldest of 19 major peacebuilding
interventions since 1989 with the highest per capita value of post-conﬂict aid and as a
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result provides an extreme and instructive case.3 The persistence of nationalist party
elites has been explained by post-war power structures based on patronage of state
jobs and funds, connections to criminal elements, economic informality, and control
of state-owned enterprises.4 In addition to their central role in post-war politics, clien-
tilistic relationships and ethnic division are also seen as central for social order.5 These
two characteristics are mutually reinforcing in that patronage networks have been
strengthened by the ability to divide and conquer potential common interests of
groups of citizens along ethnic lines.
Based on these ﬁndings, governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be characterized
as neopatrimonialism, deﬁned by patronage and clientilistic power relations within the
institutions of rational-legal statehood.6 Patrimonial power relationships and neopatri-
monialism have also been used to describe and explain post-war governance in
countries including Cambodia, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda.7 These power
relations are used to explain low levels of institutional responsiveness to citizens’ con-
cerns and an equilibrium lacking in inclusive governance outcomes which beneﬁt mar-
ginalized groups. In addition, neopatrimonialism means that “formal rules, elections
and public bureaucracies exist and matter but in the reality of neopatrimonial regime
informal rules and norms take precedence over formal institutions”.8 The degree of
divergence between formal institutions and informal rules provides another reason
for pessimism if even the few formal outcomes beneﬁting marginalized groups are
not followed by substantive outcomes in practice.
A vigorous civil society (CS), a central stated objective of liberal peace interventions,
is assigned a role within CS theory as watchdogs over government ofﬁcials, holding
them accountable, and as articulators of public interests.9 Empirically, however, civil
society organizations (CSOs) in post-war states have rather frequently been observed
to play apolitical roles or to articulate illiberal ideologies, pointing to the lack of concep-
tual clarity provided by CS theory in regard to governance roles.10 The literature on
Bosnia following CS discourse has been largely pessimistic about the potential for
CSOs to inﬂuence governance outcomes along these lines and has extensively elabo-
rated the ways that structural factors (characteristics of interventions and intervenors,
levels of CSO membership and generalized trust) lead to CSO-state disengagement and
apolitical roles.11 Neopatrimonialism however provides an undifferentiated view of
society-state interactions which empirically demonstrate variability. Lacking in these
conclusions is a systematic examination of cases of CSO engagement. As a result the
experiences of CS–state interactions remain unexplored, while doing so may reveal
and help to explain this variability and ultimately the characteristics of actors that
engage in them.12
Civic agency has been proposed as an alternative to address this plurality and ambi-
guity of CS discourses and diversity of context-speciﬁc expressions.13 This article will
explore how neopatrimonialist post-war governance shapes and constrains the
agency of CSOs and the governance outcomes that they are able to achieve. Civic
agency can thus provide needed nuance to the rather deterministic structural perspec-
tive of neopatrimonialism. This is relevant as Dolenec has concluded that in the absence
of elite decisions and limited sovereignty – conditions that apply to many post-war con-
texts – democratization “happens gradually through the strengthening of independent
social spheres, citizens and associations that control the abuse of power that is so dear to
the political elites of the region”.14
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The incremental, bottom-up democratization thesis however depends on the efﬁcacy
of citizens and associations in achieving outcomes from their interactions with the state.
Civic agency is a framework for understanding why CSO actors engage with and
struggle against the state given an inhospitable neopatrimonialist climate and a poten-
tially low sense of efﬁcacy. The article will elaborate and apply civic agency to illuminate
struggles involving CSO participation in governance processes. The research was guided
by the following question: Under what conditions can civic agency contribute to inclusive
governance outcomes?
The article makes several contributions to the literature on post-war governance.
The application of “civic agency” provides clarity to debates regarding “local agency”
by elaborating the factors leading to the emergence of agency vis-à-vis the state. Adopt-
ing civic agency as an object of study can provide insight into its origins and develop-
ment by a longitudinal focus on the self-conceptualization of speciﬁc actors. Secondly,
patronage and clientilism have been commonly referred to in order to explain the lack
of intended outcomes of intervention, abuse of public resources, and low levels of public
goods. Neopatrimonialism in contrast is more normatively neutral in the way that it
describes patterns of interaction and expectations which constrain the agency of
actors within the state and society. By adopting it, this article contributes to understand-
ing the possibilities for agency of both CSO and state actors. Its application can provide
a framework for clarifying the origins and structural limitations to this agency.
Based on extensive empirical research within eight case study CSOs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the article applies civic agency as a framework to explain the con-
ditions and outcomes of CSO–state interactions. The women’s, youth, and social
welfare CSOs were selected based on their articulation of political goals as ident-
iﬁed by key informants. For each CSO, one to three initiatives were investigated
in-depth using process tracing to document the goals, actions taken, outcomes,
and multiple perspectives on the reasons for the outcomes. Interviewees referred
to “dead letters on a page” (mrtvo slovo na papiru) to describe unimplemented
formal outcomes of engagement with the state and indicating the experience of
neopatrimonialism. Despite this description, the article does ﬁnd that the combi-
nation of persistent political claims and application of predominantly transac-
tional capacities vis-à-vis political actors can lead to inclusive governance
outcomes.
Theoretical framework
Civic agency is situated within debates regarding local agency in the liberal peace litera-
ture, followed by a discussion of the deﬁnitions and literature on the civic agency
concept which provide a basis for its operationalization. Civic agency is approached
via the distinction between participatory and transactional capacities. The framework
concludes by diagramming the relationships explored in the research question and
two subquestions.
Civic agency
The exploration of civic agency can beneﬁt from following Richmond and MacGinty’s
call towards a “local turn”, meaning a shift in epistemology from interventionism to the
ideational constructions of local actors and the processes, practices, and
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interrelationships that shape them.15 Liberal peace literature has emphasized local
agency and the “hybridity” that result from the meeting of indigenous and external dis-
courses, actors and political projects but there are varied meanings for local agency.16
For authors in the critical International relations tradition the locus of local agency
is resistance to the hegemonic dimensions of liberal peace interventions and under-
standing and engagement with local agency is central to conceptualized emancipatory
approaches to peacebuilding.17 In policy debates about increasing local ownership,
interest is largely focused on understanding the agency of elites.18 Local agency can
also mean a focus on grassroots agency and small-scale and everyday actions, at
times considered “hidden agency”.19 Finally local agency can mean to focus on the
struggles which lead to legitimate institutions in different contexts based on local-inter-
national mixture of identities, norms, and practices.20 These myriad deﬁnitions raise the
question of whether local agency provides conceptual clarity given that it reﬂects
respective authors’ epistemological frameworks. This is made explicit in David Chand-
ler’s critique of grassroots understandings of local agency based on the way that it
locates the barriers to development at the ideational level without considering structural
limitations.21
Civic agency may have utility within these debates because it is explicit about its nor-
mative assumptions and narrower in its focus. Civic agency was deﬁned by Boyte to
mean “people’s capacities, individually and collectively, to be agents of their lives and
of development”, within its proponents’ research agenda of “civic driven change”
(CDC).22 This agenda focuses on a system of governance that fosters self-organization
around politically-empowering projects.23 Civic agency does not adopt a position
restricting local agency to grassroots or elites as articulated above. Rather it focuses
on agency on behalf of collectivities vis-à-vis the state.24 In this point it is more explicit
in its focus on the connection between CSO action and governance than CS discourses.
Moreover, its adoption focuses attention on those CSOs which do articulate political
goals despite the limitations of a neopatrimonialist system and what can be learned
regarding their experiences of engagement in governance processes. This attention
may provide insight into the process of strengthening pluralist power relations often
understood to be central to democratic governance.25 Relevant to neopatrimonialism
is the potential of CDC to look “beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as
voting, to the historical processes and fundamentals of power accumulation and repro-
duction”, and its sensitivity to contention between endogenous and exogenous values,
measures, and processes.26
Although agency is central to actor-based theoretical models, it can be challenging to
operationalize. As put by Long: “Agency is usually recognised ex post facto through its
acknowledged or presumed effects”.27 To answer this challenge, for this inquiry civic
agency was deﬁned as “the intention, perception of capacity, and action to create
change for a common good” leading to operationalization based on the intentions,
capacities, and actions. Framing as “a common good” lies between the easily contested
“public good” subject to the logic of collective action, and partial or club goods which
only beneﬁt contributing members.28 A common good is thus understood as a non-
excludable good from which a group beyond those who directly contribute beneﬁt.
While this deﬁnition notes that capacities and perceptions of capacities are a needed
component to understand and analyse civic agency, the following section will turn to
examining two forms of capacity from empirical research.
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Participatory and transactional capacities
Scholarship on political mobilization by CSOs in Eastern Europe has found that low
levels of individual participation and CSO membership do not inherently limit the
CSO capacities and the efﬁcacy of CSO action. Rather this research suggests that analy-
sis of individual participation as “participatory activism” should be complemented by
theory of “transactional activism”: “ties – enduring and temporary – among organized
nonstate actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other insti-
tutions”.29 Participatory activism encompasses individual and group participation in
civic life, electoral politics, and interest group activities as well as contentious politics.
Transactional activism was formulated based on observed salience of linkages
between grassroots organizations protesting the building of a new ring road around
Budapest to NGOs with professional advocacy and subject expertise and to authorities
which facilitated negotiation related to activists’ goals. Its transactional nature relates to
strategic networking and problem-solving with authorities as means to achieve desired
ends. Proponents of transactional capacity do not dispute the weakening effects of low
CSO membership, rather they claim that the transactional character of activism merits
attention due to its implications for the potential of coalition building, and negotiation
with the state and elites.30 The two forms are additionally distinguished by the way that
the media is used in transactional activism to shape public debates and inﬂuence various
publics, rather than to mobilize for protest events.31 This observation regarding the use
of media in transactional activism was also observed in the case studies.
The transactional characterization can be understood to emphasize temporary and
instrumental characteristics, however the deﬁnition above focuses on the ties – the
relationship – itself. Since many transactions are eased by relationships of trust, trans-
actional capacity also includes a relational dimension. Although the advocacy actions
encompassed within “transactional capacity” are similar to those of interest groups
within pluralist democratic governance,32 proponents of the concept argue that it is
the ties themselves and character of the relationships that are the source of capacity
within democratizing polities rather than participatory mobilization and its inﬂuence
on public opinion and electoral politics.33 “Perception of capacity” in the operationali-
zation of civic agency refers to the actors’ reﬂexive understandings; it is not just analysis
of the actions undertaken that provides analytical clarity but also the actors’ under-
standings of their efﬁcacy. Neopatrimonialism may shape provisions for participation
in that decision-making power does not reside in formal institutions and participation
mechanisms but rather these institutions become permeable to the personal interests
and preferences of some state ofﬁcials. This inquiry then may provide insight into
the way that a neopatrimonialist context shapes and constrains civic agency. The
observed distinction between participatory and transactional capacity helps to form
the expectation before commencing the empirical research that transactional capacity
may be more effective than participatory capacity given a neopatrimonialist context.
The article will elaborate and apply civic agency to illuminate struggles involving
CSO participation in governance processes. The research was guided by the following
question: Under what conditions can civic agency contribute to inclusive governance out-
comes? In order to answer this question, two subquestions will be ﬁrst explored: Are gov-
ernance outcomes formal or substantive? and Do CSOs demonstrate participatory or
transactional capacities? The addressed concepts and relationships are shown in
Figure 1.
DEMOCRATIZATION 5
Methodology
Data was collected via triangulation of methods using semi-structured interviews, docu-
ment analysis, and process tracing.34 Three focus areas of youth, women, and social
welfare were chosen as groups marginalized within patronage-based power structures.35
Interviews with 27 key informants, selected to represent diverse and socially-signiﬁcant
perspectives,36 were used to identify change initiatives by registered CSOs within each
focus area vis-à-vis the state at any level. Rather than a representative sample of all
CSOs, CSOs were thus selected based on demonstrated articulation of political goals
in order to explore their potential contribution to inclusive outcomes. This choice
follows from the research interest in the conditions under which civic agency contrib-
utes to inclusive outcomes. Inclusive outcomes were understood as those that beneﬁt
the marginalized groups and the narrative will elaborate how the outcomes were
assessed for inclusiveness.
The suggested CSOs were further researched to identify their constituencies, deﬁned
as members and beneﬁciaries.37 Selecting cases based on those with identiﬁed articula-
tion of political goals and constituencies followed a most-likely case study methodology
in that CSOs were selected which were most likely to demonstrate civic agency.38 The
restriction to CSOs with constituencies further facilitated assessing the object of “a
common good”. In addition, the presence of constituencies enabled potential participa-
tory capacity through mobilizing of constituents, providing better data from which to
investigate capacities present in the deﬁnition of civic agency. Fifteen CSOs were
selected from three major urban areas for initial interviews which gathered further
information about their change initiatives.39 For each potential case study CSO, a list
of change initiatives with political goals was composed based on document analysis
and an interview with CSO leadership.
This article is based on eight case study CSOs which were selected to include each
urban area and focus area of work. The case study CSOs were diverse in size
(numbers of staff, budgets) and sources of funding (donor funds, government, member-
ship and donations). In selecting one to three of the initiatives for further study, a cri-
teria was that given outcomes indicated an ongoing policy change, rather than for
example a onetime ﬁnancial allocation. Preference was also given to completed pro-
cesses, although as the narrative will explain this turned out to be more ambiguous
in practice. In some cases completed meant withdrawal from the process without
achieving the intended outcome. The inclusiveness of outcomes was investigated
using the number of participants and beneﬁciaries from the respective constituencies
and whether outcomes applied to all members of an intended group. Process tracing
Figure 1. The concepts and relationships as clariﬁed in the two subquestions.
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involved interviews with state and other CS actors and relevant internal and public
document review. Selected initiatives had existed for at least one year in order to
provide material for the process tracing.
Process tracing was selected in order to examine causal processes between initial
conditions and governance outcomes, factoring in responses of multiple actors in
their context, based on its suitability for understanding decision-making.40 It factored
in the actions and explanations of other stakeholders and the political actors who
made the decisions which lead to a given observable outcome, rather than taking
CSO claims of attribution at face value. In the process tracing, the hypothesis that
CSO actions contributed to observed outcomes was weighed against alternative expla-
nations. It covered the time from assertions of goals to the outcomes claimed by CSOs.
In addition, ongoing events after the outcomes were also investigated. Triangulation
provided multiple data streams regarding key events and decisions which were used
to assemble narrative descriptions. The process tracing included contextual analysis
of relevant initiatives and actions by other actors. The observed outcomes, types of
actions taken, and relative contribution of civic agency to the outcomes in contrast
to actions by other actors formed the basis for answering the research question.
During the process tracing there were several methodological challenges. The out-
comes were selected based on CSO interviews, thus there was a potential bias based
on self-aggrandizing narratives and ﬁnancial interest to justify outcomes to donors. Sec-
ondly the neopatrimonial environment fosters obscuring of political decisions, often the
decision-making process, and potential ﬁnancial interests. Finally the subjective nature
of determining the relative contribution of CSO action to conﬁrmed outcomes creates
the possibility of conﬁrmation bias on the part of the researcher. In order to mitigate
these factors, document review was used to conﬁrm the outcomes and sequence of
events. The outcomes were also investigated regarding their inclusiveness as described
above. The actors’ accounts of when one event led to another was evaluated based on
the sum of the evidence including whether two events happened close in time. In a
small number of cases, decision makers explicitly identiﬁed the causal role of CSO
agency leading to a given outcomes which was given particular weight.41 Both the evi-
dence for the role of CSO actions and for that of the actions of other actors is available in
the supplemental materials.
Findings
The ﬁndings section begins by grounding the narrative with an analysis of each of three
ﬁelds of action. The two subquestions address civic agency via the components of its
deﬁnition: focusing on goal formulation, the actions taken and their implications for
understanding the salience of CSO capacities, and the nature (formal or substantive)
of the outcomes. These subquestions are used as a basis for a more challenging exam-
ination of the evidence for a causal link between civic agency and inclusive outcomes
and the conditions that fostered this result.
Governance outcomes
The following analysis focuses on civic agency on the part of women’s, youth, and social
welfare CSOs in turn, particularly addressing whether formal outcomes were followed
by substantive outcomes. Addressing domestic violence was a primary governance goal
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of each of the women’s CSOs identiﬁed by key informants and is illustrative because of
the possibility to study parallel processes in the sub-national Federation and Republika
Srpska (RS), each of which have their own criminal codes, police, and responsible social
welfare institutions. The outcomes claimed by the case study CSOs include establish-
ment of domestic violence shelters, criminalization of domestic violence, and improved
responses to victims by state institutions such as the police, schools, and centres for
social work. Domestic violence was criminalized in both the Federation and RS
which was initially resisted by the drafting Ministries and remains a subject of
ongoing contestation on the part of a case study CSO in the RS.42 The system of (par-
tially) publicly-funded domestic violence shelters, run by CSOs, represents an atypical
success in securing public funds on an ongoing basis.
When asked about the impact of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to coor-
dinate responses to domestic violence victims, one policewoman in Mostar indicated its
relevance by quickly pulling it out of the papers on her desk. However, she also noted its
lack of implementation in practice because of regulatory and budgetary factors both in
her own but also other signatory institutions.43 Similar CSO-initiated MOUs have also
contributed to positive changes in the responses to calls related to potential domestic
violence on the part of local police and centres for social work.
However, most of the formal outcomes beneﬁcial to domestic violence victims were
infrequently implemented if at all. This was due to institutional weaknesses (legal
inconsistencies, varied interpretations, lack of developing mandated guidelines necess-
ary for implementation of the law) and apparently a lack of will to allocate the necessary
funds. Having undertaken commitments to fund domestic violence shelters, both Fed-
eration and RS Ministries introduced extensive technocratic criteria for the selection of
CSOs to run them.44 In the perceptions of CSO actors, the intention was to secure state
funds for politically-acceptable CSOs or to bring them under the control of political
actors in place of those that had advocated for their adoption. Substantive outcomes
regarding police and court responses to domestic violence have been similarly
limited and inconsistent.
The outcomes that case study youth CSOs claimed as the result of their actions were
regular activities and educational efforts with public funds up to 10,000 Euros/year per
CSO. The CSO Democratic Youth Movement (DYM) committed volunteer time over a
one-year period to participate in the creation of the Novo Sarajevo municipal youth
strategy and lobbied at budget hearings to maintain its funding.45 Its implementation
once approved however was repeatedly delayed for political reasons (suspension
during an election campaign) and bureaucratic reasons (budgeting cycles, delays due
to writing regulations for a tender process).46 A Mostar youth strategy, initially pro-
posed by the CSO Abrašević in 2007, and ﬁnalized for adoption by November 2012,
had neither been made available nor was scheduled for approval as of January
2016.47 Abrašević’s successful claim to a property title was the only such case that
was observed over three years of ﬁeldwork, and based on this resource Abrašević con-
tinues to offer cultural programmes as well as demonstrating civic agency by supporting
city-level activism with broad transformational goals.
For the families of developmentally-disabled individuals (DDIs) in the RS, formal
outcomes include the introduction of daily centres and minimal (41–82 €/month)
ﬁnancial support.48 Substantive outcomes were limited by the introduction of new pro-
cedures which required yearly veriﬁcation of disability status by several doctors, causing
a ﬁnancial burden and delaying beneﬁts particularly for rural beneﬁciaries. An Open
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Network campaign in order to establish the infrastructure for organ transplants appears
to have led to the allocation of funds and the establishment of transplant teams.49 Sub-
stantively, as of 2016 only a few transplants had been conducted.
CSO staff repeatedly observed that formal outcomes had not been implemented in
practice, noting that laws, strategies, and conventions are “dead letters on a page”.
This image supports the neopatrimonialist framing in the way that these instruments
of rational-legal statehood do not indicate, direct, or bind the decisions of state
actors or the allocation of state resources. Although weaknesses in institutional capacity
can be used to explain this lack of substantive outcomes, proponents of the neopatrimo-
nialist framing should be sceptical that additional capacity would change the underlying
power relations and nature of political decision-making.50 The narrative rather con-
tinues by focusing on the implications of this context for civic agency and particularly
for the articulation of goals vis-à-vis the state.
Interviewees referred to “Fighting against windmills” to describe the experience of
engagement with state institutions; referring not to the imaginary nature of the
opponent as in Don Quixote but rather the pointlessness of the battle.51 Their accounts
of their own efﬁcacy were characterized as a series of struggles in which the outcomes
achieved were followed by retrenchments, leading to the conclusion that their net effect
was little change. In response, the case study CSOs did not abandon engagement but did
distinguish intermediate goals, characterized by formal and institutionalist character-
istics from ultimate goals, characterized by substantive outcomes. The discrepancy
between formal and substantive outcomes is likely why CSO intentions regarding
CSO–state interactions remain very limited in scope and scale. As related by a staff
person working on behalf of the developmentally disabled:
In the negotiations with the state, we say we have 10 needs of particular rights to be regulated by
law or to be implemented, let’s go with 1 or 2 for the next 3 years, that we’ll put aside and go
step-by-step… The problem is that the rights which exist in certain laws are not implemented
in practice or the internal inconsistencies within the entity [law].52
CSOs received responses regarding the lack of available funds for achieving CSO goals
and perhaps as a result focused on modest improvements rather than broader contesta-
tion of political priorities. The goals of the studied CSOs were also limited in that they
were extremely rarely expressed in the form of implementing national solutions, likely
due to pragmatic calculation of potential success given the political salience of centra-
lization/decentralization debate as a focus of dominant ethno-nationalist political con-
tention, the risks related to challenging nationalist political projects, and personal
political orientations. Within incrementalist goals, an interviewee countered descrip-
tions of “dead letters on a page”: “Some say it’s only paper, paper, paper. We’re satisﬁed
with what we’ve done. We’re a women’s organization that works within Mostar and
Mostar is saturated with our activities. And that’s what we ﬁgured out we needed to
do”.53 The ambiguous picture of the outcomes and varied understandings of efﬁcacy
provide the context for considering the next subquestion regarding the capacities
applied by the case study CSOs.
Do CSOs demonstrate participatory or transactional capacities?
The process tracing provided signiﬁcant evidence that transactional capacity, based on
ties between CSOs, on the one hand, and state actors, elites, or other CSOs, on the other
DEMOCRATIZATION 9
hand, was necessary in achieving intended outcomes. Despite this salience of transac-
tional capacity, the processes studied also include some indications of participatory
capacities. The interaction of multiple capacities will be explored by two case studies,
the ﬁrst of which is related to advocacy regarding treatment of domestic violence in
the RS. The second considers an initiative regarding local policy undertaken by the Sar-
ajevo youth organization DYM. Despite the heterogeneity of the two cases regarding
location and beneﬁciary population they demonstrate commonalities regarding the
links between CSO action and achieved outcomes and the ways that the case study
CSOs responded to political opportunities.
United Women’s (UW) ofﬁce gives the impression of activism and activity by the
posters informing about domestic violence hotlines, the space ﬁlled with staff and
shelves stuffed with archives of previous projects. Annual reports indicate its success
in securing donor funds as well as ongoing municipal and RS ﬁnancial support and leg-
islative and regulatory outcomes related to victims of domestic violence. Seeking gov-
ernment rather than donor funding is indicated in the awarding of land by Banja
Luka City for a shelter for domestic violence victims in 2002, attributed to cooperation
between the organization and allies in the City Assembly.54 When the city adminis-
tration did not provide funding as agreed, in 2005 UW lobbied via the use of media
and direct advocacy with political actors at the local and RS levels and was successful
in securing funds for renovation and furnishing the shelter which accepted its ﬁrst ben-
eﬁciaries in February 2007.55 Seeking state funds was a strategic choice, as indicated by
one staff person:
We could have received international funds for the shelter from the very beginning but we didn’t
want that. We wanted the state to systematically address that question and that it should be a
legal responsibility of the state to provide the service and to ﬁnancially support it.56
In 2007, UW responded to an institutional provision for participation by submitting
written proposals and the participation by UW President Nada Golubović as a sole
CSO member in a working group related to the amending of the existing Law on Pro-
tection from Domestic Violence in the RS. UW’s goals were to secure more consistent
funding for all three safe houses that had been established in the RS by obligating the RS
to provide funding, and to treat domestic violence only as a criminal act. In the discus-
sion regarding whether it is a misdemeanour or a criminal act, UW President Golubović
was alone in arguing for a change to be treated only as a criminal act and ultimately did
not support the ﬁnal recommendation of the working group and instead submitted a
separate recommendation.57 UW engaged in subsequent lobbying via female parlia-
mentarians with whom it had already established relationships.58 The amended law
as adopted established that the RS should cover 70% of the cost and municipalities
30% for housing victims and children in a safe house but domestic violence continued
to be treated as a misdemeanour. The relevance of the personal orientation of state ofﬁ-
cials rather than merely implementation of established law was demonstrated when
Assistant Minister for Health and Social Welfare Ljubo Lepir publicly challenged the
safe house model, arguing that it did not solve the problem of domestic violence
because the victims’ only recourse after residing in the safe house was to return to
the same household.59 Lepir was seen as an opponent because he had earlier publicly
challenged the analysis of UW related to domestic violence and the professional quali-
ﬁcations of the staff. The transfer of administration of the safe houses to the Ministry of
Family, Youth, and Sports (FYS), headed by previous UW ally Nada Tešanović, was
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welcomed. Although the 2008 revised Law required the revision and creation of numer-
ous regulations within six months, this had not been done as of 2013, ﬁve years after its
adoption. UW’s action to organize a round table in cooperation with the Ministry FYS
was followed by the formulation and adoption of the guidelines related to the operation
and funding of safe houses.60 Finally it is worth noting that additional case study CSOs
engaged in actions regarding both establishment, regulation, and funding of domestic
violence shelters and criminalization of domestic violence in the Federation which
demonstrated largely similar dynamics regarding goals, capacities, and outcomes.
DYM began among university students in Sarajevo in 2005 articulating opposition to
nationalism and in the early days an attempt to overcome ethnic division by creation of
a Banja Luka (RS) chapter. By 2011 however, it consisted of 300 members in Sarajevo
including 40 active members without staff or an ofﬁce but as will be seen civic agency
able to respond to opportunities. In 2009, DYM was invited by Faruk Pršeš, the head of
the Novo Sarajevo municipal Department for Societal Activities, along with eight other
organizations to nominate members of working groups for creation of a Youth Strategy
for 2012–2014. Of interest for this analysis are the actions taken by DYM in support of
adoption of the Strategy and to advocate for its funding despite opposition by political
parties in the Municipal Assembly. DYM activists reported that meetings with munici-
pal assembly members and a reputation for partisan autonomy helped to achieve
approval in lobbying for adoption of the Strategy over expressed political hesitations
that doing so would beneﬁt the incumbent mayor during an election campaign.61
Further, they responded to opportunities for participation by advocacy in public hear-
ings on the budget, leading to restoration of full funding.62
These two cases are representative of the case study CSOs in that they indicate that a
highly salient capacity is relationships with political actors developed over multiple
interactions. The nature of this capacity and how it develops can be examined from
the perspectives of CSO actors and political actors. CSO actors describe effective lobby-
ing and “political action” as lobbying in person: “Now it seems in this existing system
the most effective method is political action, direct political action, lobbying party cau-
cuses”.63 Frequent government changes are seen as an obstacle to developing the
necessary kinds of relationships which demonstrated the importance of continuity.64
Women’s CSOs also directly engaged repeatedly with a few legislators and political
actors related to legal and regulatory change processes.65 Political actors for their
part emphasized that they chose to work together with CSOs with particular character-
istics. DYM was invited to participate in the Youth Strategy based on the assessment
that they would complete the task and build support for adopting the outcome. In
several of the cases political actors emphasized working with CSOs that represented
particular groups of members or beneﬁciaries. A parliamentarian highlighted the exper-
tise of CSO members of a working group. This supports the transactional characteriz-
ation in addition to the relational one – that is CSOs beneﬁt when they can bring
effectiveness via expertise and social acceptance via their members. A more critical
assessment while still conﬁrming the transactional nature was given by DYM, whose
staff later assessed that the Youth Strategy was beneﬁcial for the mayor’s re-election
campaign but that neither DYM nor youth as a group had received the anticipated
beneﬁts.66
Although transactional capacity was more salient for the outcomes, some of the same
case study CSOs also demonstrated willingness to mobilize supporters and the public.
For example, procedures for public calls in order to receive state funds were perceived as
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a front for political preferences and ﬁnancial interest over those favouring better out-
comes, but some of the organizations made their case via the media. Statements such
as “We’ll turn the world upside down” by a UW staff person in response to experienced
retrenchment in governance outcomes could be taken to indicate participatory capacity
within governance processes via contentious politics. On closer examination, however,
what was almost always meant were calls for protest via mass media that in the opinions
of the CSO actors would inﬂuence key decision makers. This matches previous ﬁndings
about the use of media within transactional capacity. Contentious politics and other
forms of participatory capacity were by themselves rarely perceived by the CSO
actors as salient capacities.
The deﬁnition of transactional capacity also addresses the quality of relations
between CSOs which was observed as an additional factor regarding multiple CSO
capacities and outcomes in the case studies. In the face of state unresponsiveness,
CSOs reached out to other potential CSO allies but frequently experienced a lack of
CSO solidarity and identiﬁed this as a reason for reduced outcomes. The case study
CSOs, claiming to work on behalf of constituencies, attempted broader mobilization
based on an expectation of similar civic agency but were repeatedly rebuffed. Despite
these setbacks, several of the case study CSOs were actively working on developing
transactional capacity by engaging with selected CSOs on a local or thematic basis.
To summarize the ﬁndings to this point, the neopatrimonialist characterization was
supported in that formal outcomes were infrequently followed by substantive outcomes
(“dead letters on a page”). The experience of engagement with the state which fre-
quently appeared futile (“ﬁghting against windmills”) led to incrementalist framing
of goals and limiting of their scope and scale. Transactional capacity via ties between
CSO and political actors was an often necessary condition for achieving governance
outcomes in a neopatrimonialist context. Participatory capacity via political mobiliz-
ation was only infrequently observed and mobilization calls also indicated elements
of transactional capacity in the strategic use of media. Despite these limitations, there
was evidence of civic agency in that many of the studied CSOs have persisted in political
claims.
Under what conditions can civic agency foster inclusive outcomes?
This article has advocated the utility of analysing cases of civic agency despite an inhos-
pitable climate. This section addressing the research question will begin by introducing
a case from one of the most difﬁcult climates for inclusive governance outcomes, the
city of Mostar. Despite the frequent difﬁculty to achieve substantive outcomes following
formal ones as discussed earlier, formal outcomes are nonetheless a necessary precon-
dition. In addition, formal outcomes can be more objectively evaluated as a change and
related to the CSOs goals. The section will next summarize the evidence from all of the
case studies that civic agency can foster formal outcomes and discuss the conditions
under which this happens.
Mostar was divided during the war and despite a period of international adminis-
tration and extensive international efforts, remains socially divided with separate insti-
tutions and spaces.67 Within this context, youth CSO Abrašević demonstrated civic
agency through providing common space, cultural programmes, and support to conten-
tious mobilization. Governance outcomes that Abrašević claimed as successful results of
CSO actions included repeated lobbying for municipal ﬁnancial support (5100 €/year)
12 R. PULJEK-SHANK
and a public campaign to secure title to a pre-war centre which identiﬁed obstructionist
ofﬁcials followed by a successful court challenge against the city government.68 Lobby-
ing included direct appeals to municipal assembly members, who indicated that these
appeals were effective based on their positive opinion of the organization and the
impact of its activities.69 Further, Abrašević demonstrated agency by active voluntary
participation within the Youth Council, established by youth NGOs with municipal
support, and initiated re-shaping the council to include high school students’ associ-
ations. Their inclusion was accorded signiﬁcance because they were known for their
advocacy in favour of overcoming ethnic division.
The Abrašević case will be used to demonstrate the methodology and support for the
ﬁndings. Multiple sources and perspectives were used to investigate the decision-
making involved in formal outcomes. Abrašević’s advocacy regarding the municipal
budget was assessed based on review of their written appeals and the minutes of munici-
pal assembly meetings and changes between drafts of the municipal budget. In addition
an assembly member, municipal staff person, and Youth Council staff were also inter-
viewed. These multiple perspectives enabled consideration of evidence that formal out-
comes were the result of CSO action against evidence that the outcomes were the results
of the actions of other actors. Direct attribution by the decision makers to CSO actions
as in the case of the Mostar assembly member, proximity in time between CSO action
and outcomes, and review of the context including the (lack of) similar decisions were
factors considered. Most importantly weighing evidence in favour of the role of civic
agency against evidence in favour of other explanations reduced the reliance on the nar-
ratives of CSO actors in causal attribution. This evidence was used to assign each
outcome to one of the categories in Table 1 which indicates that civic agency was a con-
tributing factor in each of the formal outcomes that was investigated. Supporting evi-
dence for each of the cases is available in the online supplemental materials.
Given an unfavourable neopatrimonialist context, one contributing factor to the out-
comes was the consistency of intention and persistence of action over years and even
decades. As put in one interview: “What’s most important in the whole story is that
we don’t give up, that where we see a problem we force it, and initiate a solution”.70
In another (despite the evident hyperbole):
300 times we sent the head of the Department for Societal Activities a letter, an invitation, we
called him, [they say] it’s the ﬁrst time I hear of it, pass us on to somebody else. They don’t want
any kind of cooperation. It’s political, now that is politics. We will be so stubborn that we will
enter there.71
The goals and means of struggle are demonstrated in the reﬂexive understanding of
CSO staff that, “…we are the constant policemen who constantly register problems
in practice, register where there are inconsistencies, register where rights are violated,
constantly apply pressure in the sense of ‘people change this’”, whose relation to the
state is, “a struggle, to literally claw rights out of your sleeve”.72 In a context demonstrat-
ing a lack of accountability and reliability by institutions to fulﬁl their statutory
Table 1. Factors that contributed to formal outcomes.
No formal
outcome
Civic agency no
contribution
Both civic agency and
other actors contribute
Civic agency
predominant
contributor
Civic agency only
contributor
4 0 8 4 1
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obligations, the utility of civic agency is supported by the observation that inclusive sub-
stantive outcomes are more likely in the face of CSO consistency of intention and per-
sistence of action.
The ﬁndings have implications for understanding bottom-up democratization
within a neopatrimonialist context. In the absence of established democratic norms,
the orientation of state ofﬁcials to CS actors varied from open to rejecting. Just as neo-
patrimonialism permits exploitation of state institutions for personal gain it also frees
some state actors from the strictures of bureaucratic and institutional logic, increasing
the manoeuvring room and autonomy of those who are reformist-oriented. Transac-
tional capacity between CS and state actors is a property of dyads of actors and
depends on repeated interactions and established trust. The transactional dimension
however raises the question of the stability of CSO–state links and the degree of insti-
tutionalization of inclusive governance practices. Although governance interactions
(consultation and veriﬁable outcomes) were repeated between CSO–state pairs, this
rarely expanded to broader links with other CSO or state actors.
This research into the conditions in which civic agency fosters inclusive governance
outcomes indicates a paradox between the analysis that civic agency does foster such
outcomes and the perceived lack of increasing capacity on the part of the actors. One
explanation is the observed distinction between the more common formal and less
common substantive outcomes leading to a similar distinction in CSO goal formulation.
The often necessary condition of transactional capacity to state actors works against
autonomy instead supporting relationships that are at best interdependent. In addition,
success regarding substantive outcomes occurred after persistent civic agency focused
predominantly on incrementalist rather than transformative goals. Experiences of
limited outcomes resulting from incrementalist goals further narrow goal setting
regarding future actions oriented towards the state.
Conclusion
This article began by positing that theory and research on governance in a neopatrimo-
nialist context does not adequately explain the variability in society–state interactions,
particularly the factors that foster the emergence of CSOs which make inclusive political
claims. It adopted the civic agency framework in order to follow the epistemological
“local turn” and applied it to the goals and struggles of eight CSOs from marginalized
groups. The research found that civic agency characterized by persistent political claims
and primarily transactional capacities can lead to formal inclusive governance out-
comes. However, experiences of bounded and ambiguous substantive outcomes from
engagement in governance processes encourage CSOs to have incrementalist intentions
and limit self-perceptions of capacity.
The ﬁndings support the potential beneﬁts of additional research regarding transac-
tional capacities in other post-war contexts. Given the relevance of persistent and long-
term action in achieving desired outcomes, civic agency can provide insight into the
self-conceptualization of the actors that engage in such forms of struggle despite inhos-
pitable climates. Finally, the ﬁnding that reformist-oriented state actors often played an
enabling (necessary but not sufﬁcient) role in the establishment of inclusive outcomes
supports the utility of civic agency over CS theories built on functional sectoral concep-
tualization.73 Concretely, the ﬁndings point to the relevance of key CS–state dyads for
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democratic governance processes and suggest civic agency of state actors as an area for
further research.
The ﬁnding that formal governance outcomes were infrequently followed by sub-
stantive outcomes provides additional support for framing democratic governance as
neopatrimonialism, emphasizing the persistence of customary order and authority
and distinctiveness from consolidated democracy. The relevance of relationships to
state actors for achieving given outcomes, regardless of their inclusive nature, can be
seen to strengthen personal authority and indirectly neopatrimonialism rather than
democratic governance via the rule of law and state capacity. However, the persistence
of civic agency applied in order to achieve outcomes demonstrates the potential to use
norms of democratic governance to contest the “rules of the game” and hegemony of
neopatrimonialism, shedding light on local action and contestation as necessary con-
ditions for long-term processes of post-war democratization.
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